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In the last few years several emerging market economies have been threatened by a new
generation of currency crises which in Krugman’s (1998) words is characterised “by financial
excess and then by financial collapse”. Our main question is whether emerging market
economies can follow exchange rate targets without incurring the risk of excessive capital
inflows which sooner or later would lead to a collapse of their currencies and severe economic
disruption. Our analysis is based on the assumption that monetary policy in open economies
has two interrelated operating targets: the interest rate and the exchange rate (or an exchange
rate path). It differs from the analysis in Svensson (1998) as we regard the exchange rate as a
direct target of monetary policy which is realised by exchange market interventions. In
contrast to Svensson we do not pay attention to the effect of interest rate differentials on the
exchange rate as the empirical evidence for this channel is extremely weak and often anomal
(Froot and Thaler 1990).
A central bank that tries to target the exchange rate and the interest rate simultaneously has to
observe two important conditions. One the hand, the combination of an exchange rate target
path with a certain level of domestic interest rates (which is identical with a certain value of a
monetary conditions index) has to be consistent with the domestic economic situation. For
this purpose an open-economy Taylor rule can be constructed which allows to determine the
domestic interest rate for a targeted exchange rate path. On the other hand, the exchange rate
target and the domestic interest rate have to fulfil the uncovered interest rate condition for a
given risk premium. In our view sustained violations of this constraint provide an important
explanation for the problem of speculative capital inflows.
Given this theoretical framework two main options for exchange rate policy are investigated:
a fixed nominal exchange rate target (constant exchange rate, currency board) and an
adjustable nominal exchange rate target (crawling peg, crawling band, discretionary
devaluations). We show that a regime of a fixed nominal exchange rate is difficult to
reconcile with the two conditions for an open-economy monetary policy. It is suitable only for
very small countries, for countries with a rather small inflation differential vis-à-vis the
anchor country, and in the initial phase of a stabilisation programme. For all other situations
flexible exchange rate targeting is recommended. It provides more leeway for domestic
interest policy without violating the UIP conditions. It is less prone to shifting risk premia2
which are a major problem under fixed exchange rate targets. Above all it allows to sterilise
capital inflows without any costs for the domestic central bank. Thus, there is no need for
capital-inflow controls which have been proposed by many prominent economists
1. Our
theoretical considerations are supported by empirical evidence from Asia, Latin America,
Eastern and Central Europe and the ERM I.
An important assumption of the whole paper is that the overall macroeconomic policy is
stability-oriented so that the risk of capital outflows because of inflationary policies can be
neglected.
2
In section 2 we present a somewhat simplified (but nevertheless sufficient) classification of
the options for exchange rate management in emerging market economies. Section 3 analyses
the mechanics of exchange rate targeting in general and under the specific conditions of a
disinflation phase. The problems of a fixed nominal exchange rate target are the topic of
section 4. Section 5 explains why a more flexible arrangement is much less prone to excessive
capital inflows. Section 6 proposes a dynamic interpretation of the inconsistency triangle and
summarises the main implications that can be derived from the results of the previous
sections. Section 7 concludes.
2.  Options for the exchange rate management
The number of possible institutional arrangements for the exchange rate policies of emerging
market countries is limited, in principle, to three approaches:
•  a fixed nominal exchange rate target, either in the form of a currency board or a
unilateral peg, e.g. like Austria’s “Hartwährungspolitik” vis-à-vis the D-mark,
•  a flexible nominal exchange rate target, either in the form of a pre-announced crawl or
crawling band, of a non-announced crawl (“managed floating”) or in the form of a
unilateral fixed peg with frequent discrete adjustments,
•  a freely floating exchange rate, which implies that the central bank is not aiming at a
certain target for the exchange rate. This case can be differentiated from all forms of an
                                                
1 See Council on Foreign Relation (1999, p. 3): “Emerging market economies with fragile financial systems
should take transparent and non-discriminatory tax measures to discourage short-term capital inflows and
encourage less crisis-prone, longer-term-ones, like foreign direct investment.” See also Begg et al. (1999, p. 7) ,
Reisen (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998b, p. 71).
2 For a comprehensive discussion of the requirements in other fields of macroeconomic policy see Kopits (1999).3
flexible exchange rate targeting by the criterion of a constant level of foreign exchange
reserves.
With this classification we do not make a categorical difference between “managed floating”
and a crawling peg. For the interaction between interest rate policy and exchange rate policy
the public announcement of an exchange rate target is of secondary importance. But as such
an announcement has an important effect on the transparency of monetary policy, we will
discuss it in section 7.
In the following, the option of a freely floating exchange rate will not be analysed in detail.
Above all, the empirical evidence of flexible exchange rates is rather devastating. In the last
25 years countless econometric studies on the determinants of flexible exchange rates have
been published. Almost all of them have come to the clear result that “fundamentals” however
defined have no systematic impact on the exchange rate under a floating system - at least over
time horizons of up to four or five years. Isard (1995, p. 138) summarises the evidence as
follows:
“In short, neither the behavioural relationships suggested by theory, nor the information
obtained through  autoregression, provided a model that could forecast significantly
better than a random walk. And furthermore, while the random walk model performed
at least as well as other models, it predicted very poorly.”
For small open economies a completely unpredictable exchange rate would make it very
difficult to achieve macroeconomic stability. In addition, foreign exchange markets in
emerging market economies are relatively thin, so that some large transactions could have an
even more destabilising effect. In sum, we agree with the conclusion by  Eichengreen and
Masson (1998, p. 3):
“For developing and transition countries, as with the smaller industrial countries, there
are good reasons why the right exchange rate regime (except perhaps in cases of
continuing high inflation) is not something close to an unfettered float.”4
In fact, with the exception of the exchange rates between the three key currencies (Dollar,
Euro, Yen) there are almost no countries that have deliberately refrained from foreign
exchange market intervention.
3
Besides the definition of the target, a comprehensive strategy for exchange rate policy has to
determine the width of the band around the exchange rate target, the anchor currency, and it
has to decide whether capital controls for short-term capital flows will be imposed.
3.  The mechanics of exchange rate targeting in a disinflation phase
For all forms of open economy monetary policy it is important to differentiate between two
main transmission channels: the exchange rate channel and the interest rate channel. Even if a
central bank is committed to an exchange rate target, it has to be aware of the fact that
domestic interest rates have an important effect on the domestic economy  - either via the
traditional IS/LM channel or via the balance sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). This
co-existence of an internal and external lever of monetary policy is of special importance if a
policy of exchange rate targeting is conducted in a period of disinflation.
It is obvious that any form of open economy monetary policy has to observe two important
external constraints. From the real side, a constraint is set by purchasing power parity. If a
policy of exchange rate targeting leads to a substantial real appreciation, it undermines the
competitiveness of domestic producers, increases unemployment and leads to growing current
account deficits. Kaminsky et al. (1998) show that a real appreciation is a very serious
warning signal for a currency crisis. From the financial side, an important constraint is set by
the uncovered interest parity  (UIP) condition.  Our article concentrates on the second
constraint, because it provides an important explanation for the problem of speculative capital
inflows.
Applied to a policy of exchange rate targeting, the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition
can be written as:
                                                
3 See Jadresic et al. (1999, p. 9): “Indeed, while an increasing number of these countries (together with the
emerging market economies) officially describe their exchange rate regimes as ‘managed float’ or ‘independent
floating’ (...), the fact is that most of these countries do maintain some form of de jure or de facto exchange rate
peg or otherwise narrowly limit fluctuations of the exchange rate.”5
(1)  Ds
T+ a= i-i*.
The targeted depreciation of the logarithm of the domestic currency Ds
T plus a risk premium
 a
on the expected depreciation
4 has to equal the difference between the home interest rate i and
the interest rate of the anchor country i*.
This condition can be formulated for different  time horizons. In the context of monetary
policy it seems useful to use it for relatively short periods (one or three months). This is due
to the fact that short-term interest rates are normally the main operating target of central
banks. Thus, for that time horizon the UIP condition allows to analyse the interrelationship
between the foreign and the domestic levers of monetary policy. It also takes into account the
rather myopic behaviour of foreign exchange market participants.
5
If the domestic central bank completely refrains from an autonomous interest rate policy, the
domestic interest rate is only determined by the three other variables of the equation and there
is always an equilibrium for short-term capital flows. This situation is typical for a currency
board, where traditional instruments for targeting domestic short-term rates are not available.
Figure 1 shows that the money markets rates in Estonia remained remarkably close to German
money market rates until the outbreak of the Asian crisis. Thus, the decisive feature of a
currency board is a completely endogenous domestic interest rate.
                                                
4 The term “risk premium” as it is used here and in the literature (see Isard 1995, p. 84) is defined as a risk
premium on the expected exchange rate change. Thus it is different from the literature on financial markets
where risk premia are added to a risk free interest rate.
5 The “anomal behaviour” of floating exchange rates in the context of the uncovered interest parity theory is due
to time horizons that are even shorter than the one or three month periods for which econometric tests of the
“efficiency” of foreign exchange markets are made.6




















































































































































































































































































In all other forms of exchange rate targeting central banks have to target the domestic interest
rate together with the exchange rate. The best indicator for an interest rate policy that is
incompatible with UIP are high short-term capital inflows or outflows. Thus, the problem of
excessive capital inflows simply shows a persistent violation of this equilibrium condition and
proposals to impose capital controls mean nothing else but to suspend this condition so that
countries can follow interest rate policies that are incompatible with UIP. If a disequilibrium
leads to capital inflows, the increase in reserves has to be sterilised, at least partially. The co-
existence of strong capital inflows with a constant or sometimes increasing interest rate
differential indicates that sterilised interventions can be much more efficient than it is
recognised by the literature. As Table 1 shows, the ratio of domestic assets to total assets
declined in almost all cases considerably.7
Table 1: Exchange rate targeting and changes in central bank portfolios



















7.0 14,200 67.9 24.0
Korea 1992-96 8.4 20,336 69.3 48.9









Czech Republic 1991-96 7.4
(DM and $)
8,563 40.4 29.5
Italy 1987-90 7.1 (DM) 52,990 68.2 59.6







Mexico 1990-93 19.2 18,781 69.3 30.3
Source: IFS
If a central bank uses the interest rate together with the exchange rate channel, it has to target
a monetary conditions index (MCI)
(2) MCI = r - dDq 
T with d >0
which is defined as the difference between the real interest rate r = (i-p) and the real
exchange rate target Dq
T. The factor d represents the relative weight with which the real
exchange rate affects aggregate demand. The latter is defined as
(3) Dq
T = Ds 
T + (p* - p).8
This formulation assumes that a constant real exchange change rate has a neutral effect on the
domestic economy.
In the closed economy a Taylor-rule can be defined for the real interest rate:
(4) r = r + b(p-p
T) + g(y-y
P)/y
P with b, g >0.
In this context r can be regarded as a proxy for the MCI. However, if we consider an open
economy, the Taylor rule has to be modified:
(5) (MCI =) r - dDq 
T 
!




Substituting i - p for r and rearranging for i leads to an open-economy Taylor rule:





According to this rule, the optimum domestic interest rate is calculated as the sum of an
average real interest rate  r  plus the actual inflation rate p, the weighted difference between
the actual inflation rate and the target inflation rate p
T,
 the weighted output gap and the target
for the real exchange rate. Assuming for simplicity that in the home and the anchor country
the output gap is zero, that the anchor currency has no inflation problem, and that  r  is
identical in both countries, the interest differential becomes:
(7) i-i* = p-p* + b(p-p
T) + dDq
T
or i-i* = p-p* + b(p-p
T) + dDs
T + d (p*-p)
or i-i* = (1-d) (p-p*) + b(p-p
T) + dDs
T.
As the combination of interest rate and exchange rate policy has to be compatible with UIP
equation (7) can be inserted in the equilibrium condition formulated in equation (1):
(8) Ds
T + a = i-i* =(1-d)(p-p*) + b(p-p
T) + dDs
T.9
The intuition of this equilibrium condition is quite simple: A central bank can use domestic
interest rates for disinflation only to the extent that the foreign exchange market demands a
sufficiently high risk premium for the domestic currency at the given exchange rate target.
Thus, strong capital inflows are a signal that a central bank is following a restrictive interest
policy which is incompatible with an equilibrium on international financial markets.
This “disinflation-adjusted uncovered interest parity condition” can now be used to analyse
three different macroeconomic strategies:
•  The most abrupt disinflation via the exchange rate channel is achieved if the central bank
keeps the nominal exchange rate constant , i.e. Ds
T = 0. This approach has been followed
by Estonia, the Czech Republic (until the May 1997 crisis), Argentina, Mexico (until the
1994 crisis) and most of the East Asian countries.
•  An intermediate solution can be characterised by an exchange rate target that aims at a
depreciation that equals the difference between the targeted inflation rate and the foreign
inflation rate, i.e. Ds
T = p
T-p*. Such an “active crawl” has been followed by Poland and
Hungary.
•  A third, least restrictive variant is an exchange rate target which simply compensates for
the existing inflation differential , i.e. Ds
T = p-p*. Chile’s crawling band system and the
exchange rate policy of Brazil and Indonesia (until the crises) are examples for such a
“passive crawl”.
6
From equation (8) the equilibrium risk premia a* for these three strategies can be calculated
as follows (Table 2):
Table 2: Equilibrium risk premia (a*) for different exchange rate targets
Case D Ds
T a a*
I. constant nominal rate 0 (1-d)(p-p*) + b(p-p
T)




III. passive crawl p-p* b(p-p
T)
These results show that the equilibrium risk premium declines from case I over case II to case
III. Table 3 presents some concrete values for the policy variables: r*=3%, p*=2%, b=0.5,
                                                
6 See Eichengreen and Masson (1998, p. 32).10
d=0.25, p=10%, p
T=6%. It also shows the value for the domestic and the foreign nominal
interest rate.
Table 3: Three examples for equilibrium risk premia
Case D Ds
T a a* i* i
I. constant nominal rate 0 8 5 13
II. active crawl 4 5 5 14
III. passive crawl 8 2 5 15
Thus, for an exogenous risk premium a central bank has to find out the optimum policy mix
(Table 4). For instance, if the exogenous risk premium is 5 %, a domestic interest rate of 14 %
requires an “active crawl”, while a constant exchange rate would lead to undesired capital
inflows. In other words, for any  disinflation strategy a choice has to be made about the
relative importance of the interest rate channel and the exchange rate channel. This will
depend above all on the openness of an economy (a more open economy needs less restriction
via the interest rate channel) and on the interest rate sensitivity of its foreign and domestic
sectors. The concrete path for exchange rate targeting would be the outcome of this
assessment.
Table 4: The equilibrium interest rate for a*=5
Case D Ds
T a a* i
I. constant nominal rate 0 5 10
II. active crawl 4 5 14
III. passive crawl 8 5 18
4.  Monetary policy under a constant nominal exchange rate target
4.1 Theory
For a constant nominal exchange rate the UIP equilibrium condition from equation (8) is:
(9) a* = (1-d)(p-p*) + b(p-p
T).
Compared to the other strategies of Table 2 it requires the highest risk premium. Thus, capital
inflows can be avoided only under three conditions:11
•  if the inflation differential vis-à-vis the anchor currency (p-p*) is rather small and if at the
same time the need to disinflate (p-p
T) is not very high,
•  if the risk premium is very high,
•  if a country is so small that monetary policy can mainly rely on the exchange rate channel,
i.e. d is very high.
The third condition is compatible with the observation that most countries which were able to
maintain a fixed nominal exchange for longer periods of time are typically very small
countries (Jadresic et al. 1999, p. 24).
Good examples for the first condition represent the stable long-run pegs of Austria and the
Netherlands against the D-mark. Table 5 shows that these two countries had a an inflation
differential of almost zero vis-à-vis the anchor country Germany at the time they fixed their
exchange rates.
The second condition explains why a constant exchange rate target can be useful policy tool
in the early stages of a macroeconomic stabilisation strategy (Bofinger 1996). After a period
of very high and volatile inflation and a low credibility of policy-makers, the markets will not
immediately be convinced that the new regime is sustainable. Thus, the risk premium can be
very high. But as soon as the risk premium declines, an exit strategy is needed (Eichengreen
and Masson 1998).
This illustrates a specific problem of all constant exchange rate targets. The risk premium for
short-time horizons (one to three months) can be very unstable over time. If a fixed peg is
introduced in a period of very high inflation, the risk premium will initially be very high, then
go down to almost zero and after some time increase again. In countries with lower inflation
differentials vis-à-vis the anchor currency, investors will normally expect that the exchange
rate will remain constant for the time being even if they do not believe in the sustainability of
an announced exchange rate target in the longer run. Over time, especially if a constant
nominal rate is associated with a real appreciation, the risk premium increases sharply.
The problem of a variable risk premium is described in Figure 2 which presents the policy
options of a central bank in an open economy. The y-axis shows the restrictive pressure which
is exerted by the exchange rate target: it is defined as the difference between the actual12
inflation differential ( p-p*) and the targeted depreciation  Ds
T (which is identical with a
measure for the real appreciation of the currency considered). The domestic real interest rate r
is depicted on the x-axis. The parameters are assumed to be the same as for Table 3 (r*=3%,
p*=2%, b=0.5, d=0.25, p=10%, p
T=6%).
For given values of i* and a the si-lines show combinations of Ds
T and i which are compatible
with an UIP equilibrium. From the logic of UIP, the interest rate differential has to increase
with the targeted depreciation. Thus, the si-line is downward sloping. Each point of the si-line
is associated with a certain monetary conditions index. As the real interest has a higher weight
than the real appreciation, the MCI increases, i.e. monetary policy becomes more restrictive if
one moves the si-lines downward. .
Figure 2: Variable risk premium and constant nominal exchange rate
r
p-p*-DsT









For a constant nominal exchange rate (Ds
T=0) and a risk premium a0 of zero, the domestic
nominal interest rate has to equal the foreign rate. With the values of Table 4, the nominal13
interest rate is 5 % and the real rate is – 5%. On the real-exchange axis, the value is 8 (i.e. the
difference between  p and  p*) as the exchange rate does not accommodate the inflation
differential. This policy mix is associated with an MCI of -3, which indicates an expansionary
monetary policy. If the central bank wants to maintain at least a real interest rate of zero
(which would lead to an MCI of 2), this point is not on the si-line with a risk premium (a0=0);
it would require a risk premium of a1=5 . Thus, such a monetary policy would lead to short-
term capital inflows. The experience of several currency crises has shown that after a period
with a very low risk premium, the risk premia tend to get very high. If the premium exceeds
the value of 5, but if the central bank does not increase the interest rate, capital outflows are
induced.
Thus, under a constant nominal exchange rate target, shifts in risk premia confront a central
bank with two equally unpleasant options:
•  It can try to maintain an UIP equilibrium permanently, which leads to unstable monetary
conditions in the domestic economy,
•  It can try to maintain stable monetary conditions but this leads first to excessive inflows
and later to excessive outflows.
If a constant nominal exchange rate is maintained for a rather long period of time, the specific
problem of an exchange-rate illusion is created: private agents develop a very strong belief in
the constancy of the nominal exchange rate. As a result domestic firms start borrowing abroad
in the “cheap” foreign currency. In this situation, a restrictive interest rate policy can become
completely ineffective. A high domestic interest rate policy simply drives the enterprise sector
into more foreign currency lending. Additional counterproductive effects are produced as
higher domestic interest rates attract more foreign investors that want to profit form the short-
term stability of the domestic currency even if they know that it is not sustainable. Their
lending to domestic banks in the domestic currency has the effect that it weakens the credit
rationing by domestic banks. This destabilising effect of higher interest rates in a situation
with exchange rate illusion is described by Froot et al. (1998, p. 3):
“(...) international investors are ‘trend chasers’. Indeed, trend chasing – interpreted to
mean that an increase in today’s returns leads to an increase in future flows, without
holding current and past inflows constant- seems to explain 60-85 percent of the
quarterly covariance between emerging market inflows and returns.”14
4.2 Evidence
Table 2 shows that the conflict between stable domestic monetary conditions and an equili-
brium on the foreign exchange market increases with the inflation differential vis-à-vis the
anchor currency and the difference between the actual inflation rate and the inflation target. It
is therefore interesting to look at those ERM I countries which have successfully fixed their
exchange rate vis-à-vis the D-mark (Table 5). From this experience the critical inflation
differential seems to lie in the range of 3.75 percentage points. Subtracting a certain safety
margin, the critical value could be established at 3 %.
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Netherlands 21.03.83 -0.49 0.30 yes
Denmark 12.01.87 3.79 5.84 yes
Belgium 12.01.87 1.48 1.87 yes





























Greece 16.03.98 (entry) 3.60 / yes
Sweden 17.05.91 (peg) 
1) 8.10 3.27 no
Finland 14.10.96 (entry) -0.84 0.14 yes
United Kingdom 08.10.90 (entry) 7.43 6.07 no
Austria December 81 (peg) 
2) 0.12 -0.76 yes
1)  Sweden pegged its currency to the ECU from 17 May 91 – 19 November 92.
2)  The last significant change of the Schilling/DM exchange rate took place between September 79 and the end
of 81 (appreciation of the Schilling of about 4.5 %).
Source: IFS
If the inflation differential is higher, a constant nominal exchange rate target is normally
unsustainable. This is not only confirmed by those ERM I countries which had to adjust their
parities after 1987 or even left the system (United Kingdom), but also by the failed attempts15
of the Czech Republic and Mexico to maintain a constant exchange rate at a time where they
still had a pronounced inflation differential against their anchor countries (more than 10
percentage points in the Czech Republic in 1993 and about 9 percentage points in Mexico in
November 1991). The only exceptions are Estonia and Argentina, but it was already pointed
out that these countries had not tried to follow an activist  disinflation policy by keeping
domestic interest rates high.
The experience of the Asian countries is more difficult to interpret. On the one hand, the long
periods of a stable Dollar rate in Malaysia and Thailand fit the observation that a fixed rate
can be sustainable if the inflation differentials are very low. In the second half of the 1980s
both countries had lower inflation rates than the United States. In this area the crises were
initiated by the very low short-term Dollar rates in 1994/95 combined with a substantial
Dollar depreciation vis-à-vis the Yen. Thus, the external and the internal channel of monetary
policy were too expansionary. As a result the Asian countries tried to dampen the domestic
economy with a restrictive interest policy in the years 1994/95. But as already mentioned, in a
situation of exchange rate illusion such a policy induced domestic firms to lend more and
more in the foreign currency without dampening the domestic economy. As it was not
possible to exert a sufficiently strong pressure on the domestic sectors under fixed rates, a
depreciation should have been targeted combined with higher nominal rates.
5.  Disinflation under an adjustable nominal exchange rate target
5.1 Theory
Thus, for countries which have an inflation differential of more than 3 to 4 percentage points
an adjustable exchange target seems the preferable solution. Of course, as Table 2 shows, an
adjustable exchange rate target also requires a consistent interest rate policy, if excessive
capital inflows are to be avoided. But for situations with a substantial inflation differential or
a strong asset-price inflation this approach offers many advantages compared with a fixed
rate. For the real sector of the economy the risk of a real depreciation due to inflation inertia
can be avoided. For financial markets an adjustable exchange rate target makes it much easier
to cope with the problems of capital inflows:
•  For a given risk premium Table 4 and Figure 2 illustrate that a higher MCI can be
achieved without jeopardising the equilibrium on foreign exchange markets.16
•  If the exchange rate adjustment is made in the form of a permanent depreciation
(“crawling peg”), the problem of shifting risk premia can also be reduced, as one-way
bets are no longer possible. A more constant risk premium avoids the threat of unstable
interest rates for domestic firms.
•  In addition, a central bank can always increase a risk premium which it regards as too low.
While this is possible under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate target, a flexible target
with a wide band avoids that such a policy of “causing ripples” is limited by reaching the
limit of the band.
•  If the targeted depreciation and the interest rate are substitutes for monetary restriction,
which the construction of the MCI assumes, a central bank could react to shifting risk
premia by adjusting the policy mix. For instance on the si-line for a0=0 an MCI of 2 is
associated with a nominal depreciation of 6 2/3 % and a nominal interest rate of 11 2/3 %.
If a shifts to 5, the same MCI can be achieved with a nominal interest rate of 10 % and a
constant nominal exchange rate. However, this substitutability requires the somewhat
unrealistic assumption that the risk premium is independent of the concrete exchange rate
target.
A very important advantage of an adjustable exchange rate is related to the sterilisation of
interventions. In principle, a central bank is able to avoid an appreciation of its own currency
simply by interventions on the foreign exchange market. In order to maintain a certain level of
domestic interest rates, the liquidity impact of interventions has to be sterilised with domestic
monetary policy instruments (reduction of domestic credits or even offering some kind of
deposit facility). While domestic assets are in principle available without any limitation and in
the case of a deposit facility the sterilisation potential is also unlimited, a hard budget
constraint can be created by the costs of intervention. With a constant exchange rate, these
costs are determined by the difference between the domestic interest rate and the interest rate
in the anchor country. With a positive interest rate differential to the anchor currency, a
prolonged policy of sterilised intervention can become very costly. If a central bank follows a
flexible exchange rate target, sterilisation can be made without any costs. Thus, sterilised
intervention provides an additional degree of freedom to monetary policy. It can
simultaneously target the domestic interest rate and a floor for an exchange rate path.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. Let us assume that the central bank targets an annual (t0 to t1)
depreciation of 5%. At the time when the exchange rate reaches the lower limit A of the band17
(say –1% from the target path TT’), the central bank starts to intervene in the foreign
exchange market. The two dotted lines AB and AC represent the “no-loss-paths” which
means that along these lines the loss from the interest rate differential (i-i*= 5% on line AB
and i-i*= 5%+a on line AC when there is a risk premium)
7 is compensated by the increase of
the value of the foreign exchange reserves caused by a successful depreciation of the domestic
currency. Costs are only created if the exchange rate moves below the no-loss-path despite the
intervention of the central bank. But this situation will never occur provided that the central
bank has an unlimited sterilisation potential.














The situation turns out to be much more different in the case of capital outflows. There is a
clear budget constraint for a central bank trying to defend its currency against a devaluation.
Nevertheless, by avoiding speculative inflows, a central bank can reduce the risk of excessive
outflows.
                                                
7 Remember that we are considering sterilised interventions. An increase in low interest bearing foreign assets18
5.2 Evidence
The experience with flexible exchange rate targets shows that in most cases speculative
capital inflows have not been a major problem. In the ERM I from 1979 to 1986 Italy has
followed a policy of infrequent depreciations (7 realignments with a first adjustment only six
months after the start of the system) within a – 6 % band. Figure 4 shows that during this
period capital inflows remained rather limited. The situation changed significantly in the 5 ½
years of the “stable” ERM where the lira was devalued only once (3.68 %) and where the
fluctuation band was reduced to – 2.25 %.












































































































































































"stable" period of ERM I
Source: IFS
The experience of the Eastern European countries  also confirms that capital inflows are
mainly a problem of fixed exchange rates combined with inconsistent interest policies. As
Table 6 shows, the only country with excessive capital inflows was the Czech Republic which
maintained a fixed exchange rate (– 0.5%) against a currency basket until 1996. In all other
countries direct investment inflows were higher than the other financial inflows which
                                                                                                                                                        
yields to this loss when we reduce the higher interest bearing domestic credits at the same time.19
remained relatively small. Between 1993 and 1996, Estonia was – as already mentioned –
under a currency board arrangement, Hungary and Poland followed a crawling peg and
Slovenia had a managed float.
Table 6: Cumulative direct investment and other financial inflows (net) to the Eastern
European countries (1993-96)
Country Other financial inflows (net)
in % of GDP
Direct investment inflows
in % of GDP






In the Asian region, Indonesia with its de facto crawl received much less currency inflows
than Korea, Thailand and Malaysia (Table 7). The fact, that the Asian crisis started in
Thailand fits with its extremely high exposure to capital inflows. But because of a strong
contagion effect (Ito 1999, p. 28) Indonesia was also hit by the crisis.
“Indonesia appears to be the clearest case of contagion in the region. (...) By most,
Indonesia’s imbalances were among the least severe in the region, and clearly much less
dramatic than in Thailand.” (Radelet and Sachs 1998a, p. 37).
8
Table 7: Cumulative direct investment and other financial inflows (net) to selected Asian
countries (1993-96)
Country Other financial inflows (net)
in % of GDP
Direct investment inflows






                                                
8 Above all  Radelet and Sachs (1998b, p. 38) show that there was no evidence for a “boom-bust pattern in
Indonesia”.20
As above all the example of France in the ERM crises of 1992/93 shows that currency crises
tend to affect countries in the same region even if their fundamentals are solid and if they
have been able to avoid excessive currency inflows.
In Latin America, a similar picture as in the five Eastern European transition countries
emerges. Mexico, which de facto followed a fixed peg, received by far the highest capital
inflows, while the inflows were rather limited in Argentina (currency board) and Brazil
(crawling peg).
Table 8: Cumulative direct investment and other financial inflows (net) in Latin America
(selected four year periods)
Country Other financial inflows (net)
in % of GDP
Direct investment inflows
in % of GDP
Argentina (1995-1998) 8.5 8.7
Brazil (1995-1998) 5.1 8.7
Mexico (1991-1994) 19.1 6.1
Source: IFS
In sum, a flexible exchange rate targeting has the important advantage that it considerably
reduces the risk of destabilising capital inflows. In this respect it is identical with a currency
board. In both cases, interest rate policies that are incompatible with UIP can be avoided.
6.  Lessons for monetary and exchange rate policy in open economies
As we have shown, flexible exchange rate targeting provides a limited solution to the so-
called inconsistency triangle (see Padoa-Schioppa 1987). Instead of choosing one of the two
corner solutions (perfectly fixed exchange rates or an autonomous monetary policy with
freely floating exchange rates) a dynamic interpretation of the triangle allows to combine free
capital movements with an autonomous interest policy and a stable floor for an exchange rate
path. The notion dynamic refers to a time path for the exchange rate which at the given
interest rate differential has to ensure a permanent UIP equilibrium.
While such a policy is a good recipe against a currency crisis, it does not completely rule it
out. The examples of France, Indonesia and Brazil show that contagion effects can play an21
important role. In these cases the risk premium increases to levels which would require an
overly restrictive monetary policy stance. Therefore, if countries are obliged to support an
exchange rate target without external support, in the short run a major devaluation is the only
solution. As such an exit can have disastrous consequences, an international framework for
stabilising such currencies would urgently be needed.
The experience with different exchange rate arrangements in the last two decades provides
relatively clear implications for the exchange rate policy of emerging market economies:
•  A complete neglect of exchange rate policy, i.e. flexible exchange rates in the pure sense
that the central bank refrains from foreign exchange market interventions, should be ruled
out. In the past this arrangement has been practised only between the three key currencies
(Dollar, Euro, Yen) and it has led to excessive exchange rate fluctuations. The experience
of all three areas (Asia, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe) does not support
the popular view that a flexible exchange rate regime is required because “pegged
exchange rate regimes are a very dangerous strategy for emerging market economies and
make financial crises more likely.” (Mishkin 1999, p. 22) 
9
•  A fixed nominal exchange rate target can be adopted only if the disinflation process and
the process of price liberalisation is completed. For such a step the inflation differential
between the domestic currency and the anchor currency should not exceed 3 percentage
points.
•  A currency board is only advisable for countries which have a very open economy. With
a ratio of 72.5
10 Estonia certainly belongs to the group of countries with the highest degree
of openness. Under this condition it can be sufficient to rely on the external lever of
monetary policy only. The risks of this strategy have been extensively discussed in the
literature on monetary unions. However, in contrast to a monetary union, a currency board
does not protect a country against the risks of excessive interest rates due to speculative
pressure. In addition, it lacks a lender of last resort.
•  A flexible exchange rate target with a relatively wide band is the safest policy option.
The findings of this article confirm Williamson’s (1996) analyses of the experience with
crawling bands in Chile, Colombia and Israel.
11 Hungary and Poland have practised this
                                                
9 See also Blöndal and Christiansen (1999).
10 1/2 (exports+imports)/nominal GDP.
11 “(...) a crawling band is capable of achieving a reasonable trade-off between the conflicting objectives of
reducing inflation and maintaining export growth. Furthermore crawling bands appear to perform quite well in
limiting both exchange rate and reserve volatility; fixed rates perform better in the former dimension, as long as22
strategy successfully. This approach avoids above all the risk of destabilising capital
inflows. Flexible exchange rate targeting can be practised in different forms. A central
bank has to decide whether it announces the target (“crawling peg”) or not. In addition,
the crawl can be active (not fully compensating for the inflation differential) or purely
accommodating. A nominal anchor is provided only by a publicly announced active crawl.
•  If the exchange rate target is not announced, the nominal anchor has to be provided by a
publicly announced inflation target. Such an  inflation targeting would signal to the
public that the inflation target has priority but it would also make clear that the exchange
rate will not be allowed to fluctuate in an uncontrolled way. Thus, “a nominal (non-fixed)
exchange rate target could coexist with an inflation target” (Masson et al. 1997, p. 9). If a
policy of inflation targeting is combined “with greater exchange rate flexibility” (Masson
1999, S. 17), the risk of missing the inflation target because of erratic exchange rate
fluctuations is high.
•  Capital controls for short-term capital flows can be avoided if the framework for
exchange rate policy is compatible with the requirements of domestic interest rate policy.
In addition the exchange rate target should be surrounded by a “wide” band. Williamson
(1996, p. 110) recommends a band width of – 7 to 10 percent. The experience of ERM I
shows that Italy had been able to manage a substantial  disinflation with a – 6 percent
band.
7.  Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to design a link between domestic monetary policy conditions
on the one side and international financial markets restrictions on the other side. A main
reason for the numerous collapses of fixed nominal exchange rate arrangements in the past
two decades can be found in a simple disregard of the inconsistency triangle’s rules. Central
banks that are inclined to pursue a certain degree of autonomous interest rate policy in order
to  disinflate while pegging their exchange rates, become increasingly vulnerable to
speculative capital inflows caused by sustained violations of the UIP. To solve this problem a
closer look at the inconsistency triangle turns out to be instructive. While ruling out capital
controls and independently floating exchange rates, two other options that have already been
                                                                                                                                                        
they really remain fixed, but the crawling band outperforms (although not significantly) an average of fixed
rates and the adjustable peg.” (Williamson 1996, p. 101).23
practised successfully seem to be adequate for exchange rate management in emerging market
economies. First, a currency board arrangement removes all kind of monetary autonomy from
potential policy makers. Second, a flexible exchange rate targeting allows the central bank to
use both instruments, the exchange rate and the interest rate, in a way that is consistent with
an international financial markets equilibrium. The experience shows that such regimes do not
give rise to excessive capital inflows. A flexible exchange rate targeting should be followed
under the overall framework of an inflation targeting. The target values for the inflation rate,
the exchange rate and the domestic interest rate have to be derived in a way that guarantees an
UIP equilibrium.24
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